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THE POWER OF COURTS TO LET TO BAIL.
THE power to admit to bail, persons accused of offences against
the criminal laws, is one of the most important of the powers belonging to the courts. The power to bail is largely discretionary;
and it is the purpose of this article to mark the limits which have
been set to this discretion, and to present the practice of the courts,
and the principles by which they have been guided in solving some
of the most important questions connected with the exercise of
this power.
By the early English common law, all offences, including treason,
murder, and other capital felonies, were bailable at the discretion
of the court: 4 Bl. 298, 299; 2 Hale P. C. 120; Barney's Case,
5 .Mod. 323.
By the Statute of Westminster 1, chap. 13, the power to bail, as
to inferior courts and magistrates, was regulated and restricted.
This statute did not, however, affect the Court of King's Bench.
This court and its judges were left with full common-law jurisdiction upon the subject of bail: COLERIDGE, J., in Ex parte Baron-

net et al., 1 Ell. & Bl. 1.

By the common law, both before and after the Statute of Westminster, the power of the King's Bench and its judges to bail, was
unquestioned in all cases. There was no limitation upon the exercise of this power, except that found in the practice and principles
upon which the- courts and judges proceeded, and by which they
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were guided. The power belonging to the English Court of King's
Bench to bail in all cases, belongs equally to the courts of general
jurisdiction in the states of this country, deriving their systems
of jurisprudence from the common law of England, except as the
same may be controlled, or limited by constitutional or statutory
provisions. This power is necessarily incident to the power to try,
acquit, and finally discharge a prisoner.
In.the exercise of this power, the English judges have been
guided by a discretion "regulated according to the usage of law."
The discretion was not exercised according to the caprice or individual judgment of each judge ; it was a legal discretion, regulated by the rules and practice of the court, as contained and
expounded in the adjudged cases: 1 Chitty's Crim. Law 128.
The American courts have not departed from the principles of the
English cases, and it will therefore be found that the practice upon
this subject is as consistent and harmonious as upon any other
subject of which the courts have cognisance.
The rules and practice of the courts upon this subject have been
regarded by the English judges as of equal force with positive
enactment; .and it was because of an alleged abuse of discretion,
and violation of the practice of the courts, in letting to bail John
Eyre, that Junius, in his celebrated letter to Lord MANSFIELD, declared that the Lord Chief Justice was "degraded from the respect
and authority ?f his office, and was no longer de jure Lord Chief
Justice of England."
In all cases where applications are made to the courts for bail,
the seriousness of the charge, the nature of the evidence in support
of it, and the severity of the punishment awarded by law for the
offence, are the chief considerations which influence the determination of the question. It was the constant practice of the English
courts to refuse bail where the evidence created a strong presumption of guilt.
In JBaronnet's Case, ERLE, J., said: "The principle has been
fully laid down already that where a crime is of the highest magnitude, and the evidence in support of the charge strong, and the
punishment the highest known to the law, the court will not interfere to admit to bail. Where either of these ingredients is wanting, the court has a discretion which it will exercise."
In capital cases, where the presumption of guilt is strong, bail
should rarely, if ever, be allowed; because no pecuniary consideration would induce a party, charged with a capital crime, who felt
.
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that there was a strong probability of conviction, to appear for
trial.
"All that a man bath will he give for his life ;" and recognising this truth, the courts have seldom relaxed the rule that, in
capital cases, it is safest .to deny bail where there is a strong
probability of the prisoner's guilt.
"Bail is only proper where it stands indifferent whether the
party is guilty or innocent of the accusation against him, as it
often does before the trial; but where that indifference is removed
it would be absurd to bail :" Hawkins, book 2, chap. 15, sect. 20.
This rule is approved in Taylor's Case, 5 Coiien 39, and in Tke
People v. Goodwin, 1 Wheeler's Cr. Cases 153. In the latter case,
SUTHERLAND,

J., says: "I

have found no case at war with

Hawkins."
In the case of Commonwealth v. Keeper of Prison, 2 Ash.
234- a practical and safe rule is given. "It is difficult," says the
court, " to lay down any precise rule for judicial government in
such a case; but it would seem to be a safer one to refuse bail in
a case of malicious homicide, where the judge would sustain a
capital conviction pronounced by a jury, on evidence of guilt such
as that produced on the application for bail, and to allow bail where
the prosecutor's evidence was of less efficiency." The court ought
not to look further than to the nature of the offence and the
strength of the evidence in support of it. Neither the character
of the prisoner, nor his relations or situation in life, can be looked
to in determining the probability of his appearing for trial: In

re Bobinson, 23 L. J., Q. B. 286.
Upon the question, whether the court can go behind the indictment, on an application for a habeas corpus to secure bail, the
practice in the American courts is not uniform.
The practice in the English courts is to refuse to hear proof to
rebut the presumption of guilt created by an indictment. And
this practice is followed in many of the American courts. Upon
the application of Aaron Burr for bail, after indictment, Chief
Justice MARSHALL refused bail, and thought proof to rebut the
presumption raised against the defendant by the finding of the
grand jury inadmissible, although before indictment he had admitted the prisoner to bail. The same rule was followed in the
case of The United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 224.
In the case of Hight v. The United States, 1 Morris 407,
MASON, Ch. J., says: "The humanity of our law requires that be-
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fore a person shall be punished as criminal, he must be found guilty
by two independent juries. The verdict of the first raises a full
presumption of guilt up to the time of his 1trial before the second."
The same practice was followed in The State v. Mills, 2
Dev. 421, and in Benoit's Gase, 1 Martin (La.) 142. In the
case of Eight v. The United States, it was said that the provision
of the ordinance of 1787, which declares that "All persons shall
be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the proof shall be
evident or the presumption great," is merely declaratory of the
common law of the United States; and that the indictment of a
grand jury furnished the proof and created the presumption which
authorized the refusal of bail.
In Indiana, since the decision in the case of Lumm v. The State,
8 Ind. 293, the practice has been to hear the evidence, after indictment, and to let to bail upon proof that the prisoner was guilty
of a bailable offence, or upon his showing that the "proof was not
evident, or the presumption strong" that! he was guilty of a nonbailable offence. This practice has been adopted in many of the
other states: Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673; State v. Simmons,
19 Ohio 139, Under this practice the court will hear the evidence
and from it determine whether the presumption created by the
indictment is overcome by the facts presented ; if so, bail will
be allowed; but if not, the presumption remains and bail must be
refused. The indictment is not left out of view in this investigation,
but furnishes in the first instance the full presumption of guilt. If
a person is indicted for a non-bailable offence, and applies for bail,
but refuses to offer any evidence, the result must be precisely what
it would be in those courts where evidence will not be heard after
the accused is indicted; bail must be denied, and upon the ground
that the indictment furnishes a strong presumption of guilt. The
burden is upon the prisoner to show that he is entitled to bail:
Ileffrin's Case, 27 Ind. 88.
If the evidence adduced neither strengthens or impairs the presumption created by the indictment, there can be no doubt as to
the course to be pursued; the presumption would remain ; it would
be strong and bail ought to be refused. After indictment it is
not a question of guilt or innocence absolutely, and the same
certainty of guilt is not required before refusing bail, that
would be required to convict: Street v. The State of Mississippi,
9 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 749. It has been thought that the disagreement of a jury is an element in the determination of the ques-
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ion -whether the "proof is evident or the presumption strong."

In Goodwin's Case, supra, this was considered as supporting an
inference in favor of the prisoner's innocence. In Summon's (Case,
19 Ohio 139, the application for bail was upon this ground
alone; and it was denied that it was an independent ground for
bMil.
It is evident that the effect of the disagreement of a jury upon
the question of letting to bail, must depend materially upon the
grounds of disagreement. The disagreement may have been caused
by the captiousness or obstinacy of one juror. The Spanish have
a proverb, that a man had "better be a fool than be obstinate;" and
a disagreement caused by obstinacy, would be of no value whatever in determining the question of bail. The disagreement may
have been as to some matter of law. And although the jury may
determine the law, it could not be seriously contended that a difference of opinion among the jurors as to the law, would be entitled to
any consideration by the court in trying the question of bail. If the
court was informed that the disagreement grew out of an intelligent and conscientious difference of opinion in relation to matters
of fact proper to be considered by the jury, then such disagreement
might properly be considered as creating an inference in favor of
the prisoner, but otherwise the disagreement of a jury is certainly
a fa6t of no value upon the question of bail. In some exceptional
cases bail has been allowed, for special reasons, unconnected with
the question of probable guilt or innocence, before and after conviction : Rex v. Bishop, 1 Strange 9; Commonwealth v. Sem mes,
11 Leigh 665; Commonwealth v. Archer, 6 Grattan 705; Ex
parte Dyson, 25 Miss. 359.
Under provisions similar to that contained in the ordinance of
1787, some courts have thought the power to bail was taken away,
if the crime was capital, and the proof evident or presumption
great. (See 2 Ash. 227.) On the contrary it has been distinctly
held that the discretionary power, otherwise possessed by the courts,
remains, even if the crime and its punishment are the highest
known to the' law, and the proof evident: 30 Miss. 673. This is
certainly the better opinion, as the provision referred to is but declaratory of the common law, and at common law the power was
admitted and sometimes exercised; 12 Mod. 66; 5 Id. 323. In
Indiana this discretion is taken away by the following provision of
the Constitution of 1852 : " Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident or the presumption strong."

